Atomic Bombing over Japan, Hiroshima, Nagasaki Targets
By: John “Lil’
John” Cloud
At
2:45 in the morning of August 6, 1945, an American B-29 bomber flew north from Tinian
Island in the Marianas toward Japan. Three and a half
hours later, over the city of Hiroshima,
the Enola Gay dropped an 8,900-pound atomic weapon from its specially
modified bomb bay. Two thousand feet above the ground, the bomb, dubbed
"Little Boy" by its makers, detonated, leveling almost 90% of the
city.
On
August 9, another B-29, Bockscar, set out for the Kokura Arsenal on the
southwest Japanese island of Kyushu. Foul weather, however, persuaded the pilot
to proceed instead toward Nagasaki,
the home of a Mitsubishi torpedo factory. Over this secondary target Bockscar
dropped a larger device, code-named "Fat Man." Local geography spared
Nagasaki from the near total devastation suffered by Hiroshima; only one third
of the city was destroyed.

B-29
Superfortress “Bockscar”
Fat Man and Little Boy, both weapons of
unparalleled destructive power, were actually quite different. Little Boy,
fueled by highly enriched uranium-235,
was triggered by a simple "gun" mechanism; a small, slug-shaped piece
of uranium was fired down a barrel into a larger, cup-shaped piece. This
elementary design generated a destructive force of about 15 kilotons—the
equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT.
A much more complex implosion-type
device triggered Fat Man. It consisted of a plutonium core
surrounded by high explosives wired to explode simultaneously. The shock waves
from these conventional explosions triggered the fission of the plutonium,
which yielded a 22-kiloton explosion.
The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a devastating psychological impact on
the already weakened Japanese. Emperor Hirohito
accepted the U.S.' terms of surrender on August 14. On September 2, Japan
signed an official declaration of surrender aboard the U.S.S. Missouri
U.S. military officials believed that such a
massive demonstration of U.S. military power was the only reasonable way to
force an unconditional Japanese surrender. Though the islands' supply lines had
been cut, the Japanese air force was a shambles, and Tokyo
was nearly in ruins, it was still widely believed that no conventional military
action short of an invasion could make Japan surrender. In her entire history,
Japan had never been invaded or defeated. Even after the destruction of
Hiroshima, she refused to capitulate.

The decision to bomb
Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the first and last use of atomic weapons in
combat—remains one of the most
controversial in military history.
Altogether, the two bombings killed an estimated 110,000 Japanese citizens and
injured another 130,000. By 1950, another 230,000 Japanese had died from
injuries or radiation. Though the two cities were nominally military targets,
the overwhelming majority of the casualties were civilian.
Because of robust Japanese defenses and the
topography of the islands themselves, an amphibious assault would have taken a
heavy toll on U.S. forces. Military officials estimated that such an invasion
might have incurred up to a million U.S. casualties, with corresponding
Japanese military and civilian losses. Two fire-bombing raids on Tokyo earlier
in 1945 had already killed 140,000 citizens and injured a million more. The
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then, might actually have spared hundreds
of thousands of Japanese and American lives.
This justification, however, is not
universally accepted. Some sources' estimates of U.S. casualties are
significantly lower—perhaps as low as 50,000 men. It is also not entirely clear
that an unconditional Japanese surrender was impossible, especially if Russia had entered the war
before the bombing (Russia officially declared war on Japan on August 8, two
days after the destruction of Hiroshima).
Some suggest that Truman,
fearing a Soviet attempt to dominate the postwar Asian order as it had the
Eastern European, ordered the bombing to force Japan's surrender before Russia
had the chance to enter the fray (and thus earn the right to affect the peace
settlement). Truman may also have wanted to intimidate his potential rival Stalin
with the United States' new destructive capability.
Whether the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki constituted a needless tragedy
or a prudent military decision will never be certain. Those who made the
decision, as well as most of the survivors, are long gone. The effects,
though—the lingering scourge of radiation, the memory of the ghastly civilian
casualties, the psychological impact of simply knowing that such a destructive
force exists—remain. One can only hope that those who now wield the tools of
Armageddon will remember the lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a long time
to come.